Abstract: Existing theory posits that institutionalized promotion within party systems fosters credible power-sharing in authoritarian regimes, bolstering regime stability and performance. This paper, however, presents evidence indicating that such institutionalization increases protests and reduces regime stability. I argue that the career incentives of politicians within party systems incentivize violations of non-elite property rights, generating distributional injustice and escalating conflicts between governments and citizens. Utilizing data from 600,000 residential land transactions, surveys, and protest records from China, I demonstrate that: 1) local party secretaries with high career incentives tend to manipulate land prices, 2) career-seeking politicians contribute to heightened collective action on land issues, with land price intervention serving as the channel through which career incentives impact collective actions, and 3) distributional injustice is the mechanism drives conflicts between citizens and governments. These findings challenge the notion that institutionalized promotion of party cadres in authoritarian regimes enhances regime stability.